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Laying the Foundation for Social Media Prosecutions
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
Ronbert H. Schwartz*
American lawmakers and law enforcement officials face a situation
with no precedent, no standard operating procedure, and no end in sight:
international terrorism. International terrorism has threatened the
American way of life for hundreds of years, but the proliferation of
terrorist recruitment through social media platforms has heightened the
risk and sheer destruction that global terror attacks create. America
must take a role in eliminating this new wave of recruitment and the
overall war on terrorism; but the lack of accountability of social media
companies hinders America’s ability to fight back. This Article explains
and argues that holding social media companies criminally and civilly
liable for providing social media platforms to known terrorists and terror
groups is the most direct and effective method to stifle global terror
attacks, and save countless American lives. This Article proposes to
explicitly include the provision of a social media platform in 18 U.S.C. §
2339A’s definition of “material support” because the current material
support statutes do not adequately prevent terrorists from using social
media platforms to further their terroristic aims.
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INTRODUCTION
Between January 2015 and July 2016, a siege of terrorist attacks took
the lives of 28,689 people.1 The world can no longer view terror attacks
as isolated and remote threats due to the proliferation of foreign terror
organizations (“FTOs”) in the post-9/11 era.2
The American
government, along with other international entities and governments,
enacted policies and measures to prevent and combat the upsurge in
global terror.3 While some policies and measures successfully deter both
1. Lazaro Gamio & Tim Meko, How Terrorism in the West Compares to Terrorism Everywhere
Else, WASH. POST (July 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/the-scale-ofterrorist-attacks-around-the-world/.
2. See also Brigitte Gabriel, Committed to Denial Since 9/11 Some 28,000 Terrorist Attacks
Worldwide,
BREITBART
(Sept.
23,
2016),
http://www.breitbart.com/biggovernment/2016/06/14/committed-denial-since-911-28000-terrorist-attacks-worldwide
(explaining that Islamic extremist terror groups have committed 28,135 terror attacks worldwide
since 9/11 and highlighting the territorial strength ISIS has assumed).
3. See 9-11 Commission, Homeland Security, and Intelligence Reform, U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE
ON
HOMELAND
SECURITY
&
GOVERNMENTAL
AFF.,
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/issues/9-11-commission (last visited May 5, 2017), (highlighting
legislation authored by Senators Lieberman and McCain that created the 9/11 commission to
investigate why America’s defenses failed leading up to the 9/11 attacks and how to prevent another
attack from occurring); see also The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, U.S. DEP’T
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2017) (noting that the
Patriot Act expanded and increased the available penalties that the government can assess not only
against individuals who commit acts of terror, but also on those whom support terrorist operations).
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terror activity and attacks, it is clear that FTOs evade these protections
due in large part to the increased accessibility to, and lack of
accountability for their actions on, American social media platforms.4
The accessibility of social media—Facebook and Twitter, in particular—
gives FTOs an incredible tool to directly contact and radicalize potential
recruits across the globe.5 This type of direct outreach is the most
dangerous threat posed to Western nations.6 Even though FTOs cannot
persuade every person they recruit to join their fight, their social media
campaigns drum up a significant amount of terror sympathizers who
voice their support, and even incite violence, in the social media sphere.7
Some FTOs, like Hamas for example, take their social media use to a
level beyond outreach, and use social media platforms to announce
demonstrations and direct calls for violence.8
Despite the perpetual threat FTOs pose, this Article recognizes that
America must balance FTOs’ threats against the constitutional liberties—
particularly the First Amendment—afforded to American citizens and
businesses.9 The safeguarding of fundamental rights, especially free
speech, is imperative to America’s democratic structure and way of life,
4. See Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,
WHITE HOUSE—OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summit-countering-violent-extremism
(quoting
President Obama) (“The high-quality videos, the online magazines, the use of social media, terrorist
Twitter accounts—it’s all designed to target today’s young people online, in cyberspace.”); see
generally How ISIS Recruits Through Social Media, FORDHAM POL. REV. (Sept. 23, 2016),
http://fordhampoliticalreview.org/how-isis-recruits-through-social-media/ [hereinafter How ISIS
Recruits] (explaining how foreign terror organizations (“FTOs”) had a harder time reaching out to
westerners, particularly young westerners, before the social media age, but now an estimated 3,000
westerners joined in fighting alongside ISIS in Syria and Iraq).
5. How ISIS Recruits, supra note 4.
6. See id. (statement by the former senior adviser at the United States State Department, Shahed
Amanullah) (“These types of fighters are the biggest threats to Western countries because they can
travel more freely and blend in easier.”).
7. See J.M. Berger & Jonathon Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and Describing the
Population
of
ISIS
Supporters
on
Twitter,
BROOKINGS
INST.,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-isis-twitter-census-defining-and-describing-thepopulation-of-isis-supporters-on-twitter/ (estimating that from September through December,
2014, at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters, and the ISIS-supporting
accounts had an average of 1,000 followers each—which is “considerably higher than an ordinary
Twitter user”).
8. See Gwen Ackerman, Facebook Accused in $1 Billion Suit of Being Hamas Tool,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Sept. 10, 2016, 7:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201607-11/facebook-sued-for-1b-for-alleged-hamas-use-of-medium-for-terror (noting that Facebook
took down a page promoting a new Palestinian uprising against Israel that made direct calls for
violence).
9. “Congress shall make no laws abridging . . . the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
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but one must draw the line when the very utterance of speech causes
injury or is likely to incite an immediate breach of peace.10
This Article does not purport to infringe on the constitutional liberties
of American citizens by limiting what they may post on social media and
does not seek to hold individuals responsible for their social media posts.
Rather, this Article posits that the most efficient way to curb global terror
is to prosecute social media companies under the material support statutes
for knowingly providing a social media platform to a FTO. Prior to 9/11,
Congress recognized the threat that FTOs posed and enacted the material
support statutes—18 U.S.C. § 2339A (“section 2339A”) and 18 U.S.C. §
2339B (“section 2339B”)—as a way to prohibit United States citizens
from providing material support to designated terror groups.11
Individuals who violate the statutes are subject to a monetary fine,
imprisonment, or both.12
To alleviate the burden prosecutors face particularly in section 2339B
prosecutions against social media companies, this Article urges Congress
to amend section 2339A’s definition of “material support” to explicitly
include the provision of a social media platform. Including the provision
of a social media platform in section 2339A’s definition is essential
because section 2339B (i.e., the specific statute that the government uses
to prosecute individuals who support FTOs) imposes criminal liability on
companies and individuals who knowingly provide terrorists the specific
types of material support delineated in section 2339A.
Part I provides a brief overview of the two material support statutes—
section 2339A and section 2339B—but primarily focuses on section
2339B. This Part also provides an overview of civil cases brought under
18 U.S.C. § 2333 (“section 2333”), which originally targeted banks and
financial institutions. Finally, Part I examines the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”) and how it serves as the primary hurdle for
plaintiffs attempting to obtain civil relief under section 2333.
Part II discusses the status of the law regarding criminal prosecutions
under section 2339B. Specifically, Part II introduces the “coordination
test” from Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which is used to
determine whether there is a sufficient link between a defendant and a
10. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2009) (forbidding United States citizens from providing material
support to terrorist groups); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2015) (imposing penalties for violating
section 2339A and supporting terrorist groups).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (imposing a monetary fine and imprisonment of not more than
twenty years, unless the death of any person results, for whoever knowingly provides material
support or resources to a FTO).
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FTO for criminal liability. This Part also discusses the ambiguity of
Holder’s coordination test, and discusses courts’ varying broad and
narrow interpretations of the test.
Part III analyzes how the CDA and proximate cause requirements stifle
and restrict civil remedies under section 2333. Specifically, this Part
analyzes the different approaches used by the Seventh and Second
Circuits to find proximate cause. This Part also introduces Fields v.
Twitter and asserts that the district court improperly immunized Twitter
from civil liability when it applied the CDA to the facts of the case.
Part IV of this Article argues that the CDA should not immunize social
media companies from civil liability in section 2333 lawsuits because
these lawsuits are predicated upon a violation of federal law. This Part
also introduces Force v. Facebook and argues this case should lay the
foundation for social media prosecutions under section 2339B. This Part
asserts that social media companies currently possess the requisite mens
rea under section 2339B, and thus violate section 2339B, as knowingly
providing a platform to FTOs meets the existing definition of material
support and satisfies Holder’s coordination test. Part IV, however,
ultimately urges Congress to amend section 2339A’s definition of
“material support” to explicitly include the provision of a social media
platform. Part IV also urges Congress to retain section 2339B’s current
mens rea of knowledge because social media companies are now capable
of monitoring and removing terror-related content. Finally, this Part does
not argue that individuals should lose constitutional protection and
subsequently incur criminal liability for posting sympathetic, or even proterrorism, content to social media. Rather, this Part argues that Congress
must ease the burden of proof necessary to criminally prosecute social
media companies to combat the war on terror.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Material Support Statutes: Section 2339A and Section 2339B
In 1996, Congress enacted the material support statutes in response to
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; the 1995 bombing of a United
States military building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and the 1995 Oklahoma
City bombing.13 Section 2339A prohibits one from providing “material
13. Holly Chapin, Clarifying Material Support to Terrorists: The Humanitarian Project
Litigation and the U.S. Tamil Diaspora, J. INT’L SERV., 69, 69 (Fall 2011) (noting that section
2339B was part of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and that section 2339B
criminalizes support regardless of whether the assistance is for peaceful activities); see Charles
Doyle, Terrorist Material Support: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B, CONG. RES. SERV.
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support or resources . . . knowing or intending that they are to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out,” a violation of certain offenses.14 The
statute defines “material support or resources” as
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe-houses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more
individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except
medicine or religious materials.15

Section 2339A only outlaws activities that relate to one or more of the
federal crimes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B); the
enumerated offenses are ones that are most likely to be committed in a
terrorist context.16 The individual also must know or intend the support
to assist in the commission of a terrorist crime.17 Section 2339A also
imposes criminal penalties, such as fines or fifteen years of
imprisonment, on individuals who knowingly or intentionally provide
material support to be used to violate one of the enumerated federal
crimes within the statute.18 This layer includes the mens rea of specific
intent, where the defendant must have provided support with the
knowledge or intent that the resources be used to commit certain specific
violent crimes.19
Section 2339A prohibits the provision of material support when the
individual knows or intends the support will be used for the commission
of certain offenses, but section 2339B prohibits individuals from
knowingly providing material support—as defined in section 2339A—to
designated terrorist organizations or groups the individual knows engages
in terrorism.20 Section 2339B is favored for these types of prosecutions
because it does not include a specific intent element like section 2339A
requires and assesses liability for providing material support to FTOs the
individual knows to be engaged in terrorism, generally. 21 In other words,
(July 19, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41334.pdf (explaining that sections 2339A and
2339B are at the core of the United States Justice Department’s terrorist prosecution efforts).
14. Charles Doyle, Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B,
CONG. RES. SERV. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41334.pdf.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
16. See id. § 2332(a) (identifying the prohibited offenses).
17. Id. § 2339A.
18. Id.
19. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 113 (2d Cir. 2009).
20. Doyle, supra note 14, at 1.
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (requiring proof of specific intent that the provided support will be
used in the commission of an attack); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (requiring a mens rea element of
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section 2339B does not require proof that the individual knew or intended
the FTO would use that material support to commit a certain offense.
Prosecutions under section 2339B use the definition of “material
support” that section 2339A contains. Although both sections use the
same definition of “material support,” prosecution under section 2339B
is more applicable to most fact scenarios because, as mentioned above,
section 2339A requires knowledge or intent that the support be used in
an attack, while section 2339B only requires that the individual
knowingly provides support to a FTO.22 To prosecute a social media
company under section 2339B, the government must first show that the
initial provision of a social media platform fits within section 2339A’s
definition of material support and then prove the social media company
knew it provided the material support to an organization it knew was a
FTO.23
Some consider section 2339B a novel way to approach terrorism
because it seeks to prevent acts of terror, rather than punishing individuals
after the fact.24 Despite the popularity of prosecuting individuals under
section 2339B for providing material support to known FTOs on social
media, government officials have yet to prosecute a social media
company for permitting FTOs to utilize its social media platform.25
B. Civil Cases
1. Civil Standing Pursuant to Section 2333
Neither section 2339A nor section 2339B create a private civil cause

knowingly).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1).
23. See Kathleen Ann Ruanne, The Advocacy of Terrorism on the Internet: Freedom of Speech
Issues and the Material Support Statutes, CONG. RES. SERV., 1, 17–19 (2016),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44626.pdf (outlining the applicability of social media
prosecutions under section 2339B).
24. Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y, 297,
300 (2008); see also Chapin, supra note 13 (noting that previous terrorism laws were rooted in the
more traditional sense of criminalization by punishing individuals after the act was committed).
25. Emily Goldberg Knox, Social Media Companies and Material Support, JUST SECURITY
(Oct. 31, 2014, 1:18 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/16961/social-media-companies-materialsupport/ (noting the public execution of journalist James Foley on social media sparked government
officials and entities to urge social media companies to shut down accounts associated with FTOs).
Seven House Republicans implored the FBI to force Twitter to take down Hamas’ official Twitter
account. Julian Pecquet, Gaza Violence Leads Lawmakers to Call for Shuttering Terror Groups
on Twitter, HILL (Nov. 23, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/international/269141-gazaviolence-leads-lawmakers-to-call-for-twitter-shuttering.
In response, Twitter eventually
suspended Hamas’ account in January 2014. Id. As a result, requests were also made to shut down
the Twitter accounts of al-Shabaab and the Taliban. Id.

14_SCHWARTZ (1181-1218).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1188

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

6/2/2017 11:11 AM

[Vol. 48

of action, but section 2333 provides standing for United States nationals
whose person or property was injured by an act of international terrorism
(i.e., a violent act that is dangerous to human life) and authorizes suits for
treble damages.26 Congress enacted section 2333 with sections 2339A
and 2339B as a deterrence mechanism but, unlike sections 2339A and
2339B, section 2333 does not require proof of a specific mens rea.27
Since its enactment, section 2333 has primarily targeted financial
institutions, banks, and charitable organizations that provide material
support in the form of fundraising to FTOs.28 Despite private citizens’
efforts, only one bank has ever been held liable under section 2333.29
Some believe this is due to the fact that Congress intended to limit the
ability to recover civil damages against individuals who provide support
to the actual terrorist organizations that effectuated the violent attack, and
not secondary actors (i.e., financial institutions, banks, and charitable
organizations) that merely provided support to the actual terrorist
organizations that effectuated the crime.30 Courts relied on the plain
language of section 2333 and concluded that commercial banking activity
itself did not constitute “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life” and
therefore did not constitute the “international terrorism” from which the
private actor suffered.31 But the court in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation
for Relief and Development analogized a charitable organization’s
conduct of donating money to Hamas as giving a loaded gun to a child.32
The court found the charity’s act was dangerous to human life and in
violation of section 2339B’s prohibition on knowingly providing material
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (“[A]ny national of the United States injured in his person, property,
or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs,
may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold
the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.”). The statute
also provides for treble damages plus attorney’s fees. Id.
27. See Jimmy Gurule, Holding Banks Liable Under the Anti-Terrorism Act for Providing
Financial Services to Terrorists: An Ineffective Legal Remedy in Need of Reform, 41 J. LEGIS. 184,
186 (2015) (noting the mens rea requirement in section 2339B is incorporated into section 2333).
28. Id. at 184.
29. Id. The only bank ever held liable under section 2333 was Arab Bank, PLC. The bank
provided funding to Hamas and Hamas then used the money to perpetuate a series of terror attacks
between 2000 and 2004 during the Second Intifada. Discovery also revealed that the bank funded
several other FTOs in addition to Hamas. Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, No. 04-CV-02799 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 2014) (jury verdict form).
30. See Lanier Sapersten & Geoffrey Sant, The Anti-Terrorism Act: Bad Acts Make Bad Law,
248
N.Y.
L.J.
(Nov.
5,
2012),
http://files.dorsey.com/files/upload/NYLJ_saperstein_sant_anti_terrorism.pdf
(explaining
Congress’ intent when it codified section 2333).
31. Id.
32. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2008).
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support.33 Although the court found that the charitable organization
violated section 2339B, the Boim court noted that section 2333 does not
impose strict liability, so the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
provided material support with a mens rea listed in section 2339A or
2339B.34 Section 2333 also requires plaintiffs to demonstrate how the
defendant’s provision of material support to a FTO was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, creating yet another hurdle in the private
plaintiff’s path toward recovering civil damages.35
After the increased amount of terrorist attacks in 2015–16, the United
States court system faced an unprecedented number of civil lawsuits
attempting to hold social media companies civilly liable under section
2333 for sections 2339A and 2339B violations for knowingly providing
material support or resources to FTOs which resulted in the death of an
American citizen or national.36 But even if a plaintiff surpassed the
above-mentioned hurdles of proving the requisite statutory elements, the
applicable mens rea, and proximate cause, plaintiffs still have to
overcome the CDA.
2. The CDA: The Hurdle Before Civil Damages
Congress had two goals in mind when it enacted the CDA: to control
the exposure of minors to indecent material and to simultaneously
encourage the growth of web-based interactive services while promoting
free speech.37 Yet, Congress also sought to arm the United States
33. Id.
34. Id. at 691; see also Saperstein & Sant, supra note 30 (noting that Congress did not intend
section 2333 to impose strict liability).
35. Boim, 549 F.3d at 725.
36. The plaintiffs in Force v. Facebook brought suit after a viscous rampage of Palestinian terror
attacks against Israeli citizens between 2014 and 2016. Complaint, Force v. Facebook, Inc., No.
1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016). The plaintiffs allege that Facebook knowingly provided
support and resources to Hamas by allowing Hamas, and its members, to use the Facebook platform
to carry out terror activities, plan attacks, and purposely incite violence against Israelis. Id. at 2–3.
Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that Hamas used Facebook as a “gateway to other extremist sites
and online radical content,” as a means of intelligence gathering, as a method of dispersing
operational and tactical information with other Hamas members and followers, to spread
propaganda in the form of graphic photos and videos calculated to “inflame Palestinian emotions
and incite violence against Israelis and Jews,” to glorify martyrs, and to fundraise and general
material support. Id. at 20–21. In Fields v. Twitter, Fields’ wife sued Twitter under section 2333
alleging that Twitter provided material support to ISIS by allowing it to use the Twitter service,
which was the proximate cause of her husband’s death in a November 2015 terror attack in Jordan.
Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 40–52, Fields v. Twitter, No. 16-cv-00213-WHO (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 30, 2016).
37. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2); see Jeffrey Neuburger, Liability Under CDA Section 230? Recent
Lawsuit Tries to Flip the Script Against Social Media Service, NEW MEDIA & TECH. L. BLOG (Sept.
8, 2016), http://newmedialaw.proskauer.com/2016/09/08/liability-under-cda-Section-230-recent-
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government with a powerful tool when it enacted and amended the
material support statutes.38
Despite Congress’ intentions to curb terrorism with the material
support statues, the CDA’s statutory language provides one reason why
civil suits based on sections 2339A and 2339B have proved unsuccessful.
Due to the CDA’s broad-sweeping language, defendants in civil actions
assert that section 230 of the CDA bars civil claims based on sections
2339A and 2339B because the CDA does not treat the service (or social
media) provider as the “publisher” of posts or “activities” that may
violate the anti-terror laws.39 In effect, the nation’s courts and legislature
seem to give social media companies great latitude to monitor the content
on their platforms because courts do not seem to assess liability on these
companies based on posts that a third party may generate. Congress
desired to give online service providers freedom in regulating content to
preserve the delicate balance between ensuring free speech under the First
Amendment and simultaneously protecting individuals, especially
children and minors, from obscene content.40 Yet, this balancing act
proved difficult to preserve. So, as a result, fierce litigation ensued
challenging the constitutionality of the CDA.
Critics disclaimed the CDA and opined that the CDA
unconstitutionally infringed First Amendment rights.41 One of the
biggest critiques of the CDA was that its definition of “unacceptable
lawsuit-tries-to-flip-the-script-against-social-media-service/ (noting Congress’ goals when it
enacted the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)); see also Ruanne, supra note 23 (explaining
that the CDA seeks to protect against defamation and liable).
38. See Doyle, supra note 14, at 1 (explaining that Congress broadened the material support
statutes’ scope over time to include more precise definitions of material support and noting that
individuals who violate the material support statutes may be imprisoned for up to fifteen years).
39. See Jimmy Hoover, Facebook Says CDA Shields It from Palestinian Terror Liability,
LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2017, 1:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/881240/facebook-says-cdashields-it-from-palestinian-terror-liability (explaining how the CDA bars Facebook from being
treated as a publisher of the posts that incited violence against Israelis and inevitably immunizes
Facebook from civil liability). Because the CDA does not treat service providers as “publishers,”
providers are able to escape liability because they are not deemed to have created the offending
post. The provider merely allows the content or the post to be uploaded to their service, which
Congress wanted given its goal to encourage the free-flow of ideas and speech on the Internet.
CDA
230:
Legislative
History,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/legislative-history (last visited Apr. 30, 2017) [hereinafter CDA
230].
40. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 137; see CDA 230,
supra note 39 (explaining that with the CDA, Congress sought to reconcile inconsistent decisions
within the New York court system and to ensure the Internet could flourish without imposing
restrictions on what content users may post).
41. See generally Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that some
of the provisions of the CDA were too vague and violated the First Amendment).
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online speech” was too vague and overly broad.42 Because the CDA was
a broad “content-based restriction on speech,” critics contended that the
CDA could not survive strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly
tailored to effectuate a compelling government interest.43
In June 1997, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court’s rulings that the CDA unconstitutionally
restricted free speech.44 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens stated
that “the interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic
society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.”45
The Court specifically conceded the fact that the government had a valid
interest in protecting minors from potentially damaging and harmful
content online.46 The problem, however, was that the government’s
means censored online content that adults have a constitutional right to
see, send, and receive.47 Moreover, the Court took issue with the fact that
the government failed to effectuate any alternatives that were less
restrictive than the all-encompassing censorship regulations.48
Only section 230 of the CDA survived after the Supreme Court in Reno
struck down the CDA.49 Section 230 survived the Reno ruling in large
part because, unlike the rest of the CDA, this section actually promoted
free speech instead of restricting it.50 Section 230 expressly states that
“no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”51 This provision essentially mandates
courts to treat online service and content providers differently than
traditional print publications (i.e., online service and content providers
may not be liable for the content on their websites).52
42. CDA
230:
Legislative
History,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/legislative-history (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
43. Brief for Appellees at 22, 28, Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (No. 96-511) [hereinafter Brief for
Appellees in Reno].
44. Reno, 521 U.S. at 845.
45. Id. at 885.
46. Id. at 846.
47. Id.
48. See id. (emphasizing the district court’s finding of other methods, like software that prevents
children from viewing material their parents deem inappropriate).
49. See Ambika Doran & Tom Wyrich, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Turns
20, LAW360 BLOG (Sept. 7, 2016, 12:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/836281/Section230-of-the-communications-decency-act-turns-20 (explaining how only section 230 of the CDA
survived Reno).
50. CDA 230, supra note 39.
51. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998).
52. 47 U.S.C. § 230, a Provision of the Communication Decency Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (noting that online providers
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Defendants in civil litigation could take advantage of the CDA’s
broad-sweeping immunizing language CDA as a shield against liability
pursuant to violations of sections 2339A and 2339B.53 Defendants urge
that third-party-generated content triggers liability, but because the CDA
explicitly states that online providers are not the publishers of the content,
they cannot be held liable for something they did not produce.
II. DISCUSSING THE COORDINATION TEST
Holder is the seminal case on when independent advocacy loses
constitutional protection and veers into the murky waters of what is
considered providing material support to a FTO.54 The Supreme Court
in Holder went so far as to conclude that the government may block free
speech and other forms of advocacy supporting FTOs even if the aim is
to promote nonterroristic ends of the FTO.55 The Court clarified,
however, that the government may only prohibit this type of advocacy
and speech if the FTO coordinates or controls the activity; this analysis
is known as the coordination test.56 The Court held that Congress
intended the material support statutes to only reach activities “directed to,
coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”57 Because
section 2339B only prohibits material support provided to a FTO,
Holder’s coordination test serves to determine whether the (material)
support provided was “directed to, coordinated with, or controlled by” a
FTO.58 Criminal liability under section 2339B may be appropriate if the
may not be liable for the content on their websites because of the impracticality of interactive
service providers constantly monitoring user-generated content for objectionable content).
53. Benjamin Wittes & Zoe Bedell, Did Congress Immunize Twitter Against Lawsuits for
Supporting ISIS?, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 22, 2016, 9:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/didcongress-immunize-twitter-against-lawsuits-supporting-isis.
54. See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (explaining that the
Humanitarian Law Project (“HLP”) sought pre-enforcement review to ensure it could provide
humanitarian aid and political advocacy on behalf of minority groups represented by the Partiya
Karkeran Kurdistan (“PKK”) and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”), both of which are
designated as FTOs).
55. Id. at 33; see also Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Partial U.S. Victory on Terrorism,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 21, 2010, 11:49 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/analysis-partialu-s-victory-on-terrorism/ (noting that the government may block otherwise constitutionally
protected speech when that speech is directed toward supporting the violent or nonviolent aims of
a FTO).
56. Holder, 561 U.S. at 5.
57. Id.
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (holding that “whoever knowingly provides material support
or resources to a foreign terrorist organization” is in violation of the statute); see also Holder, 561
U.S. at 31 (explaining that the statute only prohibits otherwise constitutionally protected speech
when that speech is coordinated with or under the direction of a FTO, whereas independent
advocacy is constitutionally protected).
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government can demonstrate that a defendant’s activities or speech were
“directed to, controlled by, or coordinated with” a FTO. But failing to
establish coordination between the defendant and FTO merely suggests
the defendant engaged in constitutionally protected independent or
political advocacy. Even though the Holder Court enumerated a specific
test to navigate the delineation between providing material support to a
FTO and independent advocacy, the Court refused to elaborate on what
may suffice as coordination and limited its holding to the facts and
circumstances present in the Holder case.59
But mere coordination is enough, according to the Supreme Court: “It
is not difficult to conclude as Congress did that the “tain[t]” of such
violent activities is so great that working in coordination with or at the
command of [FTOs] serves to legitimize and further their terrorist
means.”60 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “to
coordinate” as “to bring into a common action, movement, or
condition.”61 But comparing Webster’s definition of coordination to the
language in section 2339B adds a layer of ambiguity and complexity
because they appear to be at odds with each other. Section 2339B
prohibits individuals from knowingly providing material support directly
to a FTO, regardless of whether it is used in, or furthers, a terror attack.
The dictionary definition of coordination, however, implies that
coordination may only be satisfied if the defendant provided support as
part of some larger common plan, which may, or may not, be aimed to
further the FTO’s terror intentions. Without more Supreme Court
guidance, lower courts are split as to what coordination truly requires and
entails.62
The Humanitarian Law Project (“HLP”) aspired to provide tangible aid
and support, by way of legal training and political advocacy, to two
FTOs: the humanitarian and political branches of the Kurdistan Workers
Party (“PKK”) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”).63
HLP sought pre-enforcement review to confirm it could provide
resources to both groups and teach them how to apply for humanitarian
59. See Denniston, supra note 55 (articulating how Chief Justice Roberts sought to emphasize
the narrow ruling in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project).
60. Holder, 561 U.S. at 30.
61. Coordinate, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 501 (1993) [hereinafter
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY].
62. See Ruanne, supra note 23, at 15–17 (illustrating the ambiguity of coordination).
63. See Holder, 561 U.S. at 9 (explaining that the Secretary of State has the authority to
designate an entity as a FTO upon finding that it is foreign and engages in terrorist activity or
terrorism and thereby threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of
the United States).
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aid and advocate for the minority groups represented by both
organizations, without violating the material support statutes.64 In an
effort to seek an injunction on applying section 2339B to HLP’s activity,
HLP asserted that section 2339B’s prohibitions were unconstitutional
because: (1) the statute violated its First Amendment right to free speech
and association because it criminalized HLP’s provision of material
support without requiring the government to prove a specific intent to
further the FTO’s terroristic objectives; and (2) the statute violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it was
impermissibly vague applied to the case’s specific facts.65
First, the Holder Court held that section 2339B’s prohibition on
content-based regulation of speech, as applied to the particular activities
HLP wished to engage in, was permissible and did not violate HLP’s
freedoms of speech and association.66 The First Amendment of the
Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to free speech.67 The
Constitution even protects speech and actions that are entirely offensive
and insensitive, but these protections are not absolute—speech can
sometimes lose its constitutional protection.68 Though section 2339B’s
restriction on content-based speech required the rigorous strict scrutiny
test to survive,69 the Court found that Congress’ desire to combat global
terrorism and protect national security was of the upmost importance and
64. HLP also wanted to provide legal advice to assist in the negotiation of peace treaties. Id. at
10.
65. Id. at 10–11, 14 (noting the HLP’s argument that its provision of humanitarian aid only
advanced the legitimate activities of the FTOs, not their terrorism).
66. See id. at 20–21 (explaining that section 2339B was not unconstitutionally vague because it
did not prohibit conduct evaluated by subjective judgments without statutory definitions); see also
id. at 32 (noting that the government can prohibit what the plaintiffs wanted to do because the
government was not restricting pure political speech, it was prohibiting the provision of material
support that, in this case, took the form of speech); see also id. at 39–40 (articulating that freedom
of association was not violated because the statute does not prohibit associating with a FTO or even
joining a FTO, but rather the statute “prohibits the act of providing material support”).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding the defendant’s act of burning the
American flag during a protest rally was expressive conduct within the protection of the First
Amendment); see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding Watts’ remark
about killing the president during a political debate at a public gathering was constitutionally
protected because it was considered a hyperbole); Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional
problem.”); Ruanne, supra note 23, at 3 (explaining some speech like fighting words, incitements
to innocent violence, child pornography, and obscenity can be restricted by the government without
constitutional concern).
69. See Holder, 561 U.S. at 27–28 (rejecting the government’s contention that intermediate
scrutiny should be applied in favor of a more rigorous standard of scrutiny because the
government’s regulation of conduct, in this case, took the form of speech).
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a compelling state interest.70 The Court then found that Congress
narrowly tailored section 2339B’s language to achieve the compelling
interest of combatting global terror and protecting national security. 71
Second, the Holder Court held that section 2339B, as applied, did not
violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for being
impermissibly vague because of the knowledge requirement.72 The
question presented for this Fifth Amendment vagueness challenge was
whether the statute “provides a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
of what is prohibited.”73 When applying that test, the Court found that
section 2339B’s knowledge requirement adhered to the Supreme Court’s
vagueness precedent74 because a reasonable person would understand
that teaching the PKK and LTTE how to petition for humanitarian relief
to the United Nations stems from “specialized knowledge.”75
Third, the Court relied heavily on legislative findings that indicated
even the provision of support intended as humanitarian aid, or even
support insulated from furthering terroristic objectives, nonetheless

70. See id. at 29–30 (noting Congress’ specific findings regarding the serious threat posed by
global terrorism and mentioning the various deadly attacks carried out in the 1990s by both the
PKK and the LTTE); see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996) (confirming that the prohibition of
plaintiffs’ proposed conduct furthers a compelling state interest because “[f]oreign organizations
that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such
an organization facilitates that conduct” (emphasis added)); Holder, 561 U.S. at 29 (citing section
323 of the AEDPA and noting that Congress removed an exception contained in section 2339A of
the material support statutes for the material support in the form of “humanitarian assistance to
persons not directly involved in terrorist activity”).
71. See Holder, 561 U.S. at 25–26 (reasoning because the statute covered speech coordinated
with FTOs and not independent advocacy that happened to support those groups, the language of
the statute made it easier for the government to illustrate how the restriction was narrowly tailored
to advance the government’s interest in combatting global terrorism); see also 18 U.S.C. §
2339A(b)(1) (excluding the provision of medicine and religious materials from the definition of
material support). These limited exceptions demonstrate how Congress carefully balanced the
interests at hand when crafting section 2339B and illustrate Congress’ superior judgment when it
comes to weighing competing interests. Holder, 561 U.S. at 36.
72. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis because it believed the
Ninth Circuit erroneously merged the vagueness challenge with the First Amendment challenge,
assuming it applied to protected speech—regardless of whether those applications were clear. The
Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of a hypothetical scenario when it should have
applied the law to the facts at hand. Id. at 19–20.
73. Id. at 18 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
74. See id. at 21 (confirming the constitutionality of the knowledge requirement “as we have
held with respect to other statutes containing a similar requirement”).
75. Id. at 22 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) and noting the proposed conduct fits within the
statute’s definition of material support and even points to the fact that the plaintiffs used the terms
“training” and “expert advice” to describe their proposed conduct throughout the course of
litigation).
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untied other resources to support terror activities.76 The Court explained
that the lack of firewalls between branches of FTOs meant that any
resource given to a FTO was “fungible,” and would thus untangle other
resources to be used in terror attacks. Essentially, giving money to the
humanitarian sector of a FTO allows the FTO to redirect money in other
places, perpetuating attacks. The Court noted that HLP’s support could
legitimize the groups, which in turn would make it easier for them to
exist, recruit members, and raise funds, all of which perpetuate more
attacks.77 Therefore, the Court concluded that HLP’s conduct and speech
were not protected by the First Amendment because they fit within
section 2339A’s definition of material support, HLP knew it was dealing
with FTOs, and there was evidence of an established coordination
between HLP and the FTOs.78
A. The First Circuit’s Broad Interpretation of Coordination
In December 2011, a jury convicted Tarek Mehanna, a United States
citizen, for attempting to provide material support to al Qaeda.79 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the government’s and district
court’s broad constructions of coordination to sustain Mehanna’s
conviction based on what the First Circuit described as two “clusters” of
activity.80 One cluster involved Mehanna translating a pro-jihadi
propaganda text from Arabic to English called 39 Ways to Serve and
Participate in Jihad, which called on Muslims to support jihad and incite
others to engage in jihad.81 Mehanna then posted the translated materials
to at-Tibyan, an online forum sympathetic to al Qaeda.82 The court
ultimately concluded that the translated propaganda fit within section
2339A’s definition of material support, as a “service,” because evidence
revealed that Mehanna desired his translation to “make an impact.”83
Using the framework in Holder, the court concluded that the translations
76. Id. at 30–32 (demonstrating that the PKK and the LTTE do not delineate between
humanitarian aid and violent activities and explaining that the provision of material support to FTOs
inevitably frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends, known
as fungibility).
77. Id. at 32.
78. Id.
79. United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013).
80. Id. at 40–41; see also Nikolas Abel, United States v. Mehanna, the First Amendment, and
Material Support in the War on Terror, 54 B.C. L. REV. 711, 733 (2013) (noting the jury
instructions included the “plain-and-ordinary-meaning” of “coordination”).
81. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 41.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 49; see Abel, supra note 80, at 732 (outlining all the evidence used to demonstrate
Mehanna’s intent).
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were a coordinated service due to Mehanna’s conversations online with
an individual who told Mehanna at-Tibyan was “al Qaeda’s English
Wing.”84 The First Circuit also highlighted that the materials Mehanna
translated were generally supportive of al Qaeda and al Qaeda even
created some of the translated materials that Mehanna posted.85 The
court also concluded that Mehanna’s translations satisfied the material
support statutes’ scienter requirements because evidence revealed
Mehanna supported the aims of al Qaeda; therefore, Mehanna knew his
material support was provided to al Qaeda with the intent to further its
terroristic endeavors.86
The second cluster, which the court placed greater weight on, centered
on a 2004 trip to Yemen where Mehanna allegedly sought out terrorist
training camps.87 The Mehanna court rejected Mehanna’s assertion that
his 2004 trip to Yemen was solely to pursue Islamic studies and
determined that on this 2004 trip to Yemen, Mehanna attempted to offer
himself and friends as recruits (i.e., material support) to al Qaeda.88 The
Court placed great emphasis on the testimonies of Mehanna’s
coconspirators, who testified that Mehanna once declared that “America
was at war with Islam” and saw “American soldiers as valid targets.”89
Most notably, one of Mehanna’s coconspirators obtained a contact person
who could get them into a terror camp upon their arrival in Yemen.90
Unlike Holder—which only determined the HLP knew it was dealing
with FTOs—the Mehanna Court found that the government could prove
84. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 48; see also Abel, supra note 80, at 732 (explaining that coordination
was established due to the fact Mehanna knew he was translating the material to “al Qaeda’s
English Wing” and hoped that the translation would make an impact).
85. See id. at 41 (clarifying that Mehanna’s use of the word “jihad” was referencing violent
acts).
86. Id.; see also Abel, supra note 80, at 732 (noting how Mehanna’s own statements contributed
to the finding he intended to further the goals of al Qaeda).
87. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 45 (rejecting Mehanna’s claims that he travelled to Yemen in 2004
in the pursuit of Islamic scholarly studies based on all the evidence, and even statements made by
Mehanna regarding his trip). For example, Mehanna attempted to locate a terrorist training camp
in Yemen and even stayed there for an extra week in search of a camp before returning home.
Mehanna’s conversations, dating back to 2001, with his coconspirators showed how the trip was in
search of terrorist camps as the group discussed different ways they could get into Iraq, and “wished
to engage in jihad if he ‘ever had the chance.’” Id.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (defining “material support,” in part, as “personnel (1 or more
individuals who may be or include oneself)”); Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 43–44.
89. See Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 44 (highlighting that coconspirators testified that Mehanna
persistently stated his belief that engaging in jihad was “a duty upon a Muslim if he’s capable of
performing it” and that this duty included violence). Mehanna also told an associate in 2006, Ali
Aboubakr, about how he had traveled to Yemen to engage in jihad, and even invited Aboubakr to
join him if he traveled abroad in search of jihad again. Id.
90. See id. at 45 (explaining that Mehanna had a plan of action after arriving in Yemen).
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that Mehanna possessed the requisite mens rea of specific intent to
convict him under section 2339A.91 In Holder, the HLP intended to
provide material support to the nonviolent ends of the FTOs, which is
why liability solely under section 2339A was not available in Holder.92
But here, Mehanna possessed the specific intent to provide material
support to al Qaeda, knowing or intending that a FTO would use this
support in a conspiracy to kill persons abroad.93
But Mehanna further argued that his actions constituted “independent
advocacy” protected under the First Amendment and that they did not
meet the requisite coordination test because his translations of al Qaeda
materials were neither provided to, nor in coordination with, al Qaeda.94
The First Circuit in Mehanna explicitly rejected Mehanna’s contention
that the government needed to show a direct and solid connection to
satisfy Holder’s coordination test to sustain the conviction.95 The court
found that even if the evidence did not establish a direct link, Mehanna’s
translations were specifically coordinated with al Qaeda.96 Mehanna’s
91. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 46 (“[T]he evidence we have summarized
sufficed to ground a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant traveled to Yemen with
the specific intent of providing material support to al-Qa’ida, knowing or intending that this support
would be used in a conspiracy to kill persons abroad.”); see generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (noting that the HLP intended to provide material support to the
nonviolent ends of the FTOs, which is why liability solely under section 2339A was not available).
92. Holder, 561 U.S. at 5. A section 2339A prosecution was not available because section
2339A requires that the provision be made with the intent or knowledge that the support given will
be used in an attack. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
93. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 35.
94. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 40–47, Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (No. 12-1461); see also
Benjamin Wittes et al., An Exchange on Tarek Mehanna, LAWFARE BLOG (Apr. 22, 2012, 3:45
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/david-cole-and-peter-margulies-exchange-tarek-mehanna
(arguing that speaking to al Qaeda is not criminal and the evidence does not show that Mehanna
used the website as an intermediary); but see Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 23, Mehanna, 735 F.3d
32 (No. 12-1461) [hereinafter Brief of Plaintiff, Mehanna] (explaining Mehanna’s translation of 39
Ways to Jihad established “coordination” because the contents of the translated material served as
an instructional guide for those who wished to engage in jihad); accord Abel, supra note 80, at
732–39 (noting Mehanna’s translated material calls upon Muslims to support jihad and to incite
other Muslims to engage in violence); but see also Second Superseding Indictment at 6–14, United
States v. Mehanna, 669 F. Supp. 2d (D. Mass. 2011) (No. 09-CR-10017-GAO) (using Mehanna’s
statement that he hoped the translated materials “made an impact” to further establish coordination).
95. See Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 49 (noting that the Holder Court explained coordination in terms
of service as “concerted activity, not independent advocacy”). The government pushed for an even
broader interpretation of coordination, where it opined that independent advocacy should be
interpreted narrowly in material support convictions. Even if a direct link was required, the
government asserted it was established because Mehanna responded directly to al Qaeda’s public
calls for support and believed his translations would further al Qaeda’s goals. Government’s Opp’n
to Def.’s Motion to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through Three of the Second Superseding
Indictment at 23, Mehanna, 669 F. Supp. 2d (No. 09-CR-10017-GAO).
96. See Brief of Plaintiff, Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 66–67 (arguing Mehanna’s activities were
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translation activities seem to fit within the common understanding of
“coordinate” because the court found that his translations were designed
to bring a common action, one of jihad and violence, against the United
States.97 The court found that the translations constituted concerted
activity because Mehanna knew that al Qaeda directly requested atTibyan to translate its propaganda materials.98
The First Circuit also followed Holder and the statutory language of
section 2339B and found that the First Amendment did not protect any
provision of material support through speech to a FTO.99 The court
sentenced Mehanna to seventeen-and-a-half years in prison, despite
arguably no concrete evidence establishing direct contact with members
of al Qaeda or the imposition of an imminent threat of violence.100
B. A Narrow Interpretation of Coordination
Some argue that a broad interpretation of “coordination” destroys the
protection afforded by the First Amendment and allows the government
to criminalize speech that it disagrees with under the guise of combatting
terrorism.101 David Cole, who served as counsel to HLP, is a leading
proponent of interpreting coordination narrowly, and stresses that a broad
approach enables the government to unfairly imprison citizens without
sufficient evidence.102 Critics like Cole (e.g., Justice Stephen Breyer),
specifically directed to al Qaeda because Mehanna answered public calls for support and considered
it an honor to be associated with al Qaeda); see also id. at 67 (noting coordination extends to
services rendered to a FTO at the organization’s own behest).
97. See supra note 94 (discussing the content and message of Mehanna’s translated materials);
see generally Brief of Plaintiff, Mehanna, 735 F.3d (highlighting Mehanna’s personal statements
of his desire to engage in jihad).
98. See Brief of Plaintiff, Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 68 (citing United States v. Maryea, 704 F.3d
55, 73 (1st Cir. 2013)) (noting the translations were coordinated because Mehanna participated in
the conspiracy to aid al Qaeda knowingly and voluntarily and did so in direct response to al Qaeda’s
requests).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2015) (“Individuals who act entirely independently of the [FTO] to
advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the [FTO’s] direction
and control.”); see Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 49 (explaining the government characterized the
translations as “service,” which is a form of material support, where service as material support
refers to “concerted activity, not independent advocacy”); but see Abel, supra note 80, at 735
(noting that Mehanna’s speech would have received greater constitutional protection had the court
and government characterized the translations as a call for violence under a Brandenburg
incitement analysis).
100. See Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 50 (explaining that neither the statute nor the Supreme Court’s
decision in Holder required a “direct link” between a defendant and a FTO for a violation to occur).
101. See David Cole, The Roberts Court vs. Free Speech, 57 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 80, 81 (Aug.
19, 2010) (comparing the modern terrorism era to the McCarthy era, where unfounded fears and
disapproval of a speaker’s viewpoint “eroded” protections afforded by the First Amendment).
102. See id. (arguing that the Holder Court based its decision on “justifications that were
unsupported by evidence”); see also Wittes et al., supra note 94 (arguing that the government failed
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believe that coordination should require more than mere contact with a
FTO to avoid an unconstitutional intrusion into free speech.103
Additionally, Cole rejects the Holder court’s notion that human rights
advocacy is fungible, and that the HLP’s assistance to the FTOs could
free up other money and resources for the groups to further their terror
objectives.104 But whether future courts will broadly or narrowly
interpret Holder’s coordination test remains unanswered.
III. ANALYZING HOW PROXIMATE CAUSE AND THE CDA IMPACT AND
RESTRICT REMEDIES IN CIVIL LAWSUITS
The material support statutes aim to deter and punish parties
responsible for deadly and horrible terror attacks, but the statutory
language creates many hurdles for prosecutors and plaintiffs alike. Civil
lawsuits are vital to the war on terrorism as they can stifle the flow of
money to FTOs, and thus cripple their operations.105 But before
prevailing on any civil claim pursuant to section 2333, plaintiffs have
additional challenges to hurdle that are unique to civil lawsuits. Plaintiffs
must satisfy Holder’s coordination test; but they also must establish
proximate causation and defeat the social media company’s anticipated
CDA immunity defense.
A. Proximate Cause
To recover pursuant to the material support statutes for either civil or
criminal damages, a prosecutor or a private plaintiff must prove that a
to provide evidence to show that Mehanna knew he translated materials for al Qaeda). For a
discussion on whether American society has become tolerant of infringement on First Amendment
rights, see generally Nicholas A. Primrose, Has Society Become Tolerant of Further Infringement
on First Amendment Rights?, 19 BARRY L. REV. 313 (2014).
103. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 43–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
there is no traditional First Amendment “categorical exception” for coordinating with a group that
is engaged in unlawful activity); Cole, supra note 101 (arguing that when “material support”
consists of speaking with or to a group, the First Amendment protects the rights of assembly and
association).
104. David Cole, What Counts as Abetting Terrorists?, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (June 21, 2010, 3:21
PM),
https://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/what-counts-as-abetting-terrorists/
(declaring that the First Amendment is all about human rights advocacy and cannot be turned into
bullets or guns); see generally Holder, 561 U.S. at 47 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rejecting the idea
that human rights advocacy is fungible on the basis that the government offered no empirical
information or evidence in support of this assertion, and the majority gave too much weight to
congressional concern “about the ‘fungible’ nature in general of resources, predominately money
and material goods”).
105. See Stephen J. DiGregoria, Note, If We Don’t Bring Them to Court, the Terrorists Will
Have Won: Reinvigorating the Anti-Terrorist Act and General Jurisdiction in a Post-Daimler Era,
82 BROOK. L. REV. 357, 376 (2016) (noting how civil lawsuits contribute to the war on terror
because they have the ability to disturb the inflow of money to FTOs).
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defendant knowingly provided material support to a known FTO.106 But
to recover civil damages, some causal connection between the conduct
alleged and the injury asserted is required under the material support
statutes. And each circuit has different standards for establishing that
proximate cause.107
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has a more relaxed standard to
establish proximate cause. In Boim, the Seventh Circuit found a Hamas
donor liable because the donor participated in the wrongful activity “as a
whole,” despite no proven causal connection between the donor’s actions
and the injury.108
But the Second Circuit, on the other hand, refused to adopt a lower
standard of proximate cause.109 In Rothstein v. UBS AG, the Second
Circuit held that a plaintiff does not establish proximate cause by merely
proving the defendant per se violated the federal statute, because
Congress did not intend to impose strict liability into section 2333.110 In
the Second Circuit, proximate cause hinges on the substantial factor test
(i.e., "whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the plaintiff’s injuries”).111
In Fields, the Northern District of California followed the Second
Circuit’s approach to define proximate cause and dismissed Fields’ civil
lawsuit against Twitter because the complaint failed to establish how
Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS proximately caused her husband’s
death.112 In Fields, Fields’ wife sued Twitter under section 2333 and
alleged that Twitter provided material support to ISIS by allowing it to
106. Holder, 561 U.S. at 17–18.
107. See Benjamin Wittes & Zoe Bedell, Facebook, Hamas, and Why a New Material Support
Suit
May
Have
Legs,
LAWFARE
BLOG
(July
12,
2016,
1:23
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebook-hamas-and-why-new-material-support-suit-may-havelegs (explaining how the Second Circuit uses the traditional proximate causation approach that uses
the substantial factor test, where the Seventh Circuit has a much lower standard).
108. Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 697 (7th Cir. 2008); see also
Wittes & Bedell, supra note 107 (contrasting the Seventh Circuit’s lower standard for proximate
cause with the Second Circuit’s higher standard).
109. Rothstein v. UBS, 708 F.3d 82, 96 (2d Cir. 2013).
110. See id. (articulating that proximate cause must be established separate from the alleged
violation occurring as Congress did not intend to impose strict liability within the statute); accord
Wittes & Bedell, supra note 107 (noting that congressional intent does not support strict liability).
111. Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ., 734 F.3d 113, 130 (2d Cir. 2013) (describing the
“substantial factor” test for establishing proximate causation); see also Wittes & Bedell, supra note
107 (reiterating that the Second Circuit requires a finding that the defendant’s conduct must be a
substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injury to establish proximate cause).
112. Fields v. Twitter, No. 16-cv-00213-WHO, 2016 WL 6822065, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
18, 2016) (dismissing the case because even under “a substantial factor test,” the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate how Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS proximately caused the injuries).
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use the Twitter service, which proximately caused her husband’s death in
a November 2015 terror attack in Jordan.113 The court found that the
complaint sufficiently alleged Twitter’s provision of material support to
ISIS and noted that ISIS used Twitter to fundraise for terrorist activities,
postinstructional guidelines and promotional videos, reach recruits across
the globe, disseminate propaganda, and incite fear.114 But the court found
that the complaint ultimately failed to establish how providing this
material support proximately caused Fields’ death, despite ISIS’ claim of
responsibility.115
Though Fields contended that ISIS’ use of Twitter proximately caused
her husband’s death because ISIS utilizes Twitter “as a tool for spreading
extremist propaganda, raising funds and attracting new recruits,” and that
“this material support has been instrumental to the rise of ISIS and has
enabled it to carry out numerous terrorist attacks,”116 the court found that
the complaint did not allege that ISIS used Twitter to directly
communicate with, or recruit, Abu Zaid—the attacker—and also failed to
establish that Abu Zaid ever used Twitter to finance, plan, or carry out
his attack.117 Rather, the complaint alleged only a thin, tenuous
connection between ISIS’ Twitter use and Abu Zaid; it claimed that ISIS’
execution of a kidnapped Jordanian pilot inspired Abu Zaid, but it failed
to connect Twitter in any way to the specific attacks.118 The Fields court
therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint and held that ISIS’ use of
Twitter was not the proximate cause of the terror attack because the fact
that “Twitter provided ISIS with material support in the form of a
powerful communication tool and that ISIS has claimed responsibility for
Abu Zaid’s actions” does not “plausibly suggest the necessary causal
connection.”119 The plaintiff in Fields asserted that ISIS’ presence on
social media may have influenced the attacker, but the plaintiff failed to
allege that ISIS used Twitter as a mechanism to carry out or plan deadly
attacks.120
113. Id. at *1–2.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *10 n.3. In claims based on the material support statutes, courts have “rejected
alleged causal connections that are too speculative or attenuated to raise to a plausible inference of
proximate causation.” Id.
116. Complaint ¶ 2, Fields, No. 16-cv-00213-WHO (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2016).
117. Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *1 (illustrating the complaint’s deficiency in alleging
proximate cause for failing to show that the attacker even had a Twitter account to begin with).
118. Id. at *9.
119. Id. at *10.
120. See Wittes & Bedell, supra note 107 (reiterating that Twitter has a strong defense to
lawsuits alleging they provided material support to terrorist groups because most complaints cannot
specifically link the attack with anything that happened on Twitter).
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B. CDA Immunization
But even if a plaintiff satisfies the proximate cause element, the
plaintiff must still hurdle the CDA immunity defense. Under the CDA,
defendants may qualify for immunization if the plaintiff’s lawsuit is: (1)
against an interactive computer service provider or user; (2) based upon
information provided by another content provider; and (3) attempting to
hold the defendant liable as a publisher or speaker of that content.121
The Fields court is the only court that ruled regarding the application
of the CDA to a civil lawsuit where the material support statues are
implicated.122 Even though the Fields court found that the plaintiff did
not establish proximate cause, the court proceeded to discuss whether the
CDA immunized Twitter and ultimately granted Twitter’s motion to
dismiss on the grounds that Twitter was immunized from liability under
the CDA because it was a mere passive service provider.123 In granting
the motion to dismiss for the Second Amended Complaint, the Fields
court did not consider whether the initial provision of Twitter accounts to
ISIS violated the material support statutes, but instead concluded that
providing accounts was “publishing activity,” protected by the CDA.124
Instead, the court framed the issue as: whether Fields attempted to hold
Twitter liable as a publisher of content that a third party generated.125
The plaintiffs in Fields provided two justifications to bolster their
argument that the lawsuit was not attempting to hold Twitter liable as a
publisher. First, they argued that the lawsuit was based on Twitter’s
provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS, and not solely based upon the
content of the posts that Twitter and ISIS disseminated.126

121. Ruanne, supra note 23, at 21–22; see also Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (listing the three-prong test for CDA protection). Section 230 defines an
interactive computer service as “any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically
a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems or services offered by
libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (1998); see also Jones v. Dirty World
Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406–07 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting how courts broadly construe
this definition to encompass websites like Facebook).
122. Ruanne, supra note 23, at 22.
123. See Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *5–6) (concluding that providing accounts to ISIS is
“publishing activity,” which section 230(c) protects because it is a decision about what content will
be posted); but see Wittes & Bedell, supra note 53 (questioning whether the CDA may immunize
a content provider when the underlying offense is an alleged violation of federal law).
124. Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *11–12; see Wittes & Bedell, supra note 53 (questioning
whether the CDA should have immunized Twitter when the complaint alleged Twitter violated
federal law).
125. Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *7.
126. Id. at *8.
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The court rejected the plaintiffs’ first theory by relying on previous
cases that broadly defined publishing activities, which included any
decision about what third-party-generated content might be posted
online.127 The Fields court adopted this broad view of publishing activity
even though the cases it relied on generally applied that reasoning to
specific offensive content posted on a specific platform, and not to the
mere provision of a platform in general.128 Rather than analyzing
whether the initial provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS constituted
material support, the Fields court reasoned that providing ISIS with
Twitter accounts was essentially the same thing as permitting content to
be posted, or declining to remove content.129 In the court’s view, the
provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS reflects “choices about what third
party content can appear on Twitter and in what form.”130 It appears that
the plaintiff’s failure to allege how Twitter specifically contributed to
ISIS’ mission—other than merely providing a forum for ISIS to post
content—influenced the court’s decision to apply the CDA as broadly as
it did.131
Next, the plaintiffs argued that the CDA did not apply because ISIS
accomplished its recruiting and other objectives through Twitter’s private
direct messaging features. The plaintiffs argued that the court should
define “publisher” under the CDA as “one who disseminates information
to the public.”132 And because private direct messages are not
“disseminated public information,” but rather private messages, the
127. Id. at *5 (citing Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 735 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014)) (explaining
that Twitter was immunized because the plaintiff’s claims were based on what third-partygenerated content Twitter allowed to be posted on its service); see Fair Hous. Council v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that determining
whether to prevent the posting of third-party material online is precisely the kind of activity that
the CDA covers); Ruanne, supra note 23, at 23 (discussing the court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s
provision-of-accounts theory of liability).
128. Ruanne, supra note 23, at 23; see Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *6 (noting that Twitter was
not liable because this case had nothing to do with information that Twitter should have posted
online).
129. Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *6; see generally Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1175
(discussing when CDA immunization is available).
130. Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *6 (citing Doe v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.
2016)).
131. Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *10 (“These allegations do not plausibly suggest the
necessary causal connection between Twitter's provision of accounts and the attack that killed
Lloyd Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach.”); see Ruanne, supra note 23, at 23 (noting deficiencies
in the plaintiff’s complaint as it focused too much on content posted to Twitter by third-parties);
but see Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 84–90, Fields, No. 3:16-cv-00213-WHO 9 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
30, 2016) (outlining the ways in which Twitter’s provision of accounts violates the material support
statutes).
132. Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *10.
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plaintiff argued that the court should not apply the CDA to the facts of
the case.133
But the court found that the CDA’s enactment is rooted in defamation
law.134
In defamation law, a court defines “publication” as
“communication [of the defamatory matter] intentionally or by a
negligent act to one other than the person defamed.”135 As a result, the
Fields court held that because it treated Twitter as a publisher, and
because defamation law does not distinguish between private and public
communication, even private direct messages fell within the scope of the
CDA’s immunization.136
Fields established that the CDA shields social media companies from
liability under the material support statutes when they are treated as
publishers.137 But the Fields decision likely cannot firmly establish that
providing a FTO a social media platform is always a publishing decision
akin to making choices about what content can appear on the website and
in what form.138 The Fields court most likely arrived at its conclusion as
a result of the plaintiff’s failure to specifically allege that Twitter
contributed to the unlawful conduct (i.e., the terror attacks) by providing
the social media accounts to ISIS.139 But such evidence in future cases
might change the court’s opinion.
Proving a social media company violated federal law might provide
plaintiffs another way to evade the CDA’s application to a case brought
under the material support statutes. Section 230(e)(1) of the CDA does
not impair the enforcement of any federal criminal statute.140 The federal
circuit courts are split, however, on whether service providers, like
Twitter, lose their civil immunity if they aided and abetted, or violated
federal law.141 The First Circuit, for example, recently held that the CDA
133. Id. at *10.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *14–15 (internal citations omitted).
136. Id. at *11 (citing several decisions in which the courts had no issues applying the CDA to
claims predicated upon transmission of nonpublic messages).
137. Id.; see Wittes & Bedell, supra note 53 (explaining CDA immunization). But see Ruanne,
supra note 23, at 21 n.200 (stating that the statute did not “create a lawless no-man’s land on the
[I]nternet” (quoting Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
2008))).
138. See Fields, 2016 WL 6822065, at *10–11 (noting that Twitter was considered a publisher
because the focus of the complaint was based on offending content).
139. See infra Part IV (articulating this Article’s proposal); see also Fields, 2016 WL 6822065,
at *9 (noting the failure to allege elements of proximate cause).
140. 47 U.S.C § 230(e)(1) (1998); Wittes & Bedell, supra note 53.
141. See Wittes & Bedell, supra note 53 (explaining how some federal courts in Texas and
Mississippi determined that Section 230 still immunizes service providers from civil liability for
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may also bar recovery where the service provider is treated as a publisher
even when the civil lawsuit is predicated upon a violation of a federal
crime.142 But the Seventh Circuit, in Doe v. GTE Corp., entertained, but
did not affirmatively reject, the idea that a provider could lose its civil
immunity for aiding and abetting a violation of federal law.143 Therefore,
demonstrating that a social media company violated federal law
potentially presents another potential avenue for plaintiffs to defeat a
CDA immunity defense.
IV. PROPOSAL
Social media companies know terrorists actively manipulate their
platforms and even former President Obama urged social media
companies to do more to combat extremism online.144 Given the
recognized connection between social media and terrorist activity, this
Article urges Congress and courts to collaboratively act to use the
material support statutes to deter and punish actors that give material
support to FTOs.
A recently filed case claiming violations of the material support
statutes, Force, has the potential to fundamentally change America’s
approach to combat terrorism by eliminating terrorists’ greatest weapon:
social media.145 This Article argues that the Force complaint should
survive a motion to dismiss and should lay the foundation for future
prosecutions against social media companies to help combat global
alleged violations of federal law, while the Seventh Circuit has considered the alternative, where
an Internet service provider would lose civil immunity for an alleged violation of federal law).
142. Doe v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2016) (noting the plain language of section
230(e) compelled the court’s conclusion that the exception from the liability shield for federal
criminal cases did not apply to civil liability even where the civil action was based on a violation
of federal criminal law).
143. See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to answer the question
of whether aiding and abetting a violation of federal law would forfeit civil immunity for providers,
while dismissing the case on other grounds).
144. See Peter Nicholas, Clinton Urges Social-Media Intelligence Sharing in Terror Fight,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2015, 5:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/clinton-urges-social-mediaintelligence-sharing-in-terror-fight-1449438763 (illustrating how social media companies know
terrorists actively manipulate their platforms); see Berger & Morgan, supra note 7 (detailing the
pervasiveness and prevalence of ISIS activity on Twitter); see also Barack Obama, President of the
United States of America, Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering
Violent Extremism (Feb. 18, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summit-countering-violent-extremism (urging social
media companies to do more to combat extremism online).
145. See Lisa Blaker, The Islamic State’s Use of Online Social Media, 4 MIL. CYBER AFF. 1,
3–4 (2015) (explaining how ISIS’ “masterful” use of social media successfully attracts new recruits
and sympathizers, especially millennials); see generally Berger & Morgan, supra note 7
(illustrating social media’s value to terrorists).
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terrorism.146 But this Article recognizes that not all cases will contain
the strong facts that the Force case comprises. Therefore, to ensure
national security and easier prosecutions against those who knowingly
support terrorist organizations, this Article proposes that Congress amend
the definition for “material support” in section 2339A to include “social
medial platforms,” which would also remove the CDA hurdle in civil
liability as a violation of a federal statute (e.g., the material support
statute) would occur the instance a social media company knowingly
provides a platform to a FTO.
A. Force v. Facebook: The Future Foundation for Social Media
Company Prosecutions Under Section 2339B
In July 2016, the estates of five victims of terrorist attacks filed a
complaint claiming that Facebook “knowingly provided material support
and resources to Hamas, a notorious terrorist organization that has
engaged in and continues to commit terror attacks.”147 The Force case
has yet to go to trial, but Facebook has filed a motion to dismiss
contending the CDA immunizes Facebook from any civil liability.
Even though section 2333 does not include any mens rea element, the
plaintiffs still must satisfy section 2339B’s mens rea requirement because
it is incorporated into section 2333(a). Therefore, the complaint alleges
that Facebook possessed the requisite mens rea of “knowingly” to impose
criminal liability under section 2339B because individual members of
Hamas managed Facebook accounts in their own names which they used
to carry out Hamas activities and the plaintiffs allege that a company as
technologically advanced as Facebook should know that these designated
terrorists actively use its services.148
146. See Complaint at 54, Force v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016)
(detailing all the required elements to prosecute a social media company under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B);
see also Benjamin Wittes & Zoe Bedell, Tweeting Terrorists, Part II: Does It Violate the Law for
Twitter to Let Terrorist Groups Have Accounts?, LAWFARE BLOG (Feb. 14, 2016, 6:35 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tweeting-terrorists-part-ii-does-it-violate-law-twitter-let-terroristgroups-have-accounts (identifying how companies may have provided material support to FTOs
and noting the potential impact the Facebook lawsuit may have).
147. Complaint at 2, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016).
148. Id. at 44 (discussing how knowledge of Hamas’ Facebook and social media use is in the
public domain and well known); see Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 208 (2d
Cir. 2014) (holding that a defendant has actual knowledge that an organization engages in terroristic
activity if the defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference as to whether the organization
engages in such terrorist activity); Adam Rasgon, Facebook Closes Hamas Leader’s Account,
JERUSALEM POST (July 13, 2016, 11:06 AM), http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-AndDiplomacy/Facebook-closes-Hamas-leaders-account-460246 (reporting that Facebook shut down
Hamas’ leader’s account seven times). Ironically, the leader condemned Facebook’s decision over
Twitter. Id.; see Becca Noy, Facebook Refuses to Take Down Video of Hamas Terrorists Training
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Facebook’s “community standards” policy reveals that it does not
actively monitor pages and posts, but only responds to complaints it
receives from other users.149 Therefore, the plaintiffs use Facebook’s
own policy to demonstrate that Facebook reviews complaints about pages
and consciously decides whether to remove or suspend a page or post,
satisfying section 2339B’s knowledge requirement.150 The Washington
Examiner levied a complaint to Facebook in 2014 regarding anti-Israel
propaganda featured on the site.151 Facebook responded by saying that
the page fit into an “approved category” under its community standards
policy and did not remove it.152 The plaintiffs could further use this
example to illustrate how Facebook’s reluctance to remove the material
satisfies section 2339B’s knowledge requirement.
As mentioned in Part I, section 2339B uses the definition of “material
support” contained in section 2339A. In the Force complaint, the
plaintiffs allege that the very provision of a Facebook account to Hamas
is “material support” because FTOs use social media to recruit, which
section 2339A includes within the definition of “material support.”153 By
providing Facebook accounts to Hamas, the plaintiffs argue that
in Gaza, JERUSALEM ONLINE (July 3, 2016, 12:30 PM), http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/inisrael/local/facebook-refuses-to-remove-video-of-hamas-terrorists-training-drill-22090 (reporting
Facebook’s refusal to take down Shahab News Agency’s posts featuring live videos of Hamas’
military drills even after the Israeli Public Security Minister reported the post and requested that it
be removed).
149. Complaint at 45, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016); see What Happens
When I Report Something to Facebook? Does the Person I Report Get Notified?, FACEBOOK BUS.,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/103796063044734 (last visited Nov. 3, 2016)
(confirming Facebook reviews complaints and decides whether to remove the content); but see
Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards# (last visited
Nov. 2, 2016) (banning organizations engaged in terrorist or criminal activity from using
Facebook).
150. Complaint at 45, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016) (providing examples
of Facebook’s application of its policies that arguably demonstrate knowledge of terrorist activity);
see 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2015) (providing for a knowledge requirement for liability to attach); Lahav
Harkov, Bill Fining Facebook, Twitter for Not Removing Incitement to Terror Gets Ministers’
Approval, JERUSALEM POST (July 17, 2016, 9:51 PM), http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/PoliticsAnd-Diplomacy/Bill-fining-Facebook-Twitter-for-not-removing-incitement-to-terror-getsministers-approval-460672 (noting Israel’s legislation to fine Facebook and Twitter for failing to
remove posts that incite terror).
151. Complaint at 45–46, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016); see Philip Klein,
Facebook Says Page Calling for Death to Jews Doesn’t Violate “Community Standards,” WASH.
EXAMINER (July 28, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/article/2551348
(reporting Facebook’s response to the complaint).
152. Complaint at 46, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016).
153. See generally id. (arguing that Facebook allows Hamas to spread violent propaganda to
encourage and incite violence, fundraise, organize demonstrations, send covert messages, and
connect like-minded individuals with a propensity to engage in acts of terrorism).
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Facebook provides an intangible service under the statute’s definition,
because Facebook’s data-usage-policy algorithm connects Hamas
members with sympathizers and other terrorists.154 Essentially, the
plaintiffs seem to identify Facebook as Hamas’ cost-free matchmaker by
providing countless potential recruits and jihadists.155
As it is currently set up, Facebook’s algorithm alerts and leads a
Facebook user who actively posts content supporting or sympathetic to
Hamas to similar content and posts, allowing Hamas to disseminate its
terroristic message to users across the globe (an objective Hamas may not
have been able to achieve on its own without the Facebook platform).156
Additionally, Facebook’s algorithm considers a user’s location and can
notify users at certain locations of Hamas’ upcoming demonstrations,
rallies, and even other terrorist activity.157
In this case, the court should align these activities pursuant to the
Holder court’s idea of fungibility.158 FTOs, like Hamas, can rely on
Facebook’s cost-free, advanced algorithms to disseminate propaganda to
potential recruits. This enables FTOs to allocate resources originally
intended for recruitment to further its terroristic intentions because now,
FTOs can accomplish recruitment objectives—without spending any
funds—through Facebook’s platform.159 Fungibility is a key principle
rooted in the material support statutes because courts interpret the statutes
to find that providing supplies, funds, goods, or services to a FTO helps
defray the group’s legitimate costs which, in turn, frees up other monies
and resources that can be used to pursue unlawful, terroristic ends.160 By
154. Id. at 49; see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30 (2010) (intimating that
social media services enable FTOs to perpetuate more terror attacks).
155. Complaint at 50–52, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016); see Hughes &
Vidino, supra note 153 (providing a more complete dissection of social media’s role in recruiting
potential jihadists).
156. Complaint at 20, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016); see Emily Goldberg
Knox, The Slippery Slope of Material Support Prosecutions: Social Media Support to Terrorists,
66 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 301 (noting how terrorists manipulate social media to find potential recruits
that are sympathetic to their cause).
157. Complaint at 20, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016).
158. See Holder, 561 U.S. at 30 (defining material support as a “valuable resource” that, when
acquired, enables the organization to utilize other existing resources to be put to violent ends); see
also H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 81 (1995) (recognizing even lawful, peaceful support provided to
FTOs can defray the costs associated with engaging in violence and terrorism).
159. See Doyle, supra note 13, at 1–2 (explaining the fungibility of material support); see
generally Complaint at 45–46, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016) (articulating
the fungibility of a Facebook account as a service).
160. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, 81 (1995) (explaining that section 2339B reflects a recognition
of the fungibility of financial resources and other types of material support).
Allowing an individual to supply funds, goods, or services to an organization, or to any
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characterizing Twitter as a “publisher,” it appears that the Fields court
may have overlooked the fact that FTOs, like ISIS, have significantly
more resources at their disposal to plan and purchase arms for attacks
because Twitter essentially recruits and disseminates propaganda for
them.161 Therefore, when characterizing Facebook’s actions in Force,
this Article urges the court to apply the concept of fungibility when
determining material support.
This Article also asserts that a court should follow the First Circuit’s
broad interpretation of “coordination.” Under a broad interpretation of
the coordination test, this Article urges the court to find the requisite
coordination because of Facebook’s conscious decision to not remove or
suspend content that FTOs post.162 Facebook’s terms of service clearly
state that it will remove or suspend accounts run by terrorists, or accounts
that post terrorist content.163 The coordination element is established due
to Facebook’s conscious disregard to enforce its own policies, which
Facebook knows allows terrorists and FTOs to flourish on social media
to pursue their terroristic ends.164

of its subgroups, that draw significant funding from the main organization’s treasury,
helps defray the cost to the terrorist organization of running the ostensibly legitimate
activates. This in turn frees an equal sum that can be spent on terrorist activities.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, 81 (1995); see also Holder, 561 U.S. at 32 (considering money as fungible
when terror groups have dual structures to raise funds because monies donated for humanitarian
aims have ultimately been used to purchase arms and explosives).
161. Instead of spending time, money, and resources on recruitment and propaganda, FTOs can
rely on services like Twitter or Facebook to spread violent messages with the single click of a
button, which enables them to focus on planning attacks and purchasing weapons; see John Hall,
ISIS Controls as Many as 90,000 Twitter Accounts Which It Uses to Spread Sick Propaganda and
Radicalise Westerners, Terror Experts Reveal, DAILY MAIL (March 6, 2015, 10:33 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2982673/ISIS-controls-90-000-Twitter-accounts-usesspread-sick-propaganda-radicalise-Westerners-terror-experts-reveal.html (quantifying just how
many Twitter accounts ISIS uses to demonstrate how quickly and efficiently ISIS can spread its
message); see also Complaint at 4–5, Fields, No. 16-cv-00213-WHO (Aug. 10, 2016) (illustrating
how Twitter essentially does ISIS’ job for it by providing ISIS with a Twitter account).
162. See Knox, supra note 156, at 316 (intimating that the benefit of increased user traffic to
social media sites could establish coordination because both the FTO and the social media company
mutually benefit from the FTOs using the platform); see also Complaint at 52, Force, No. 1:16-cv05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016) (demonstrating Facebook’s ability, but refusal, to monitor and
remove terrorist content).
163. Community Standards, supra note 149.
164. See WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 61 (defining coordination); see also Knox, supra
note 156, at 316–17 (explaining coordination in the context of social media companies’ failure to
suspend accounts); Keith Wagstaff, Facebook and Instagram Crack Down on Illegal Online Gun
Sales, NBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/facebookinstagram-crack-down-illegal-online-gun-sales-n45316 (noting that Facebook’s ability to monitor
and police content coupled with its ignorance to some content violates its own community standards
and terms of service).
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But even if the court analyzes Force pursuant to a narrow reading of
coordination, this Article contends that the Force complaint shows how
Facebook’s provision of accounts to Hamas is consistent with the Holder
court’s narrow interpretation of the coordination test.165 Facebook’s
provision of accounts to Hamas and other FTOs establishes a direct link
because any user who signs up for Facebook must agree to abide by
Facebook’s terms of service.166 This Article argues that the acceptance
of the terms of services establishes a direct link because both Facebook
and the FTO user have “communicated” with each other that each party
agrees to provide the other with something.167
And finally, the court in Force is in a prime position to remove the
CDA hurdle that has historically obstructed plaintiffs’ path to civil
liability pursuant to the material support statutes. Congress enacted the
CDA to protect individuals from indecent material. Therefore, this
Article argues that using the CDA as a shield for social media companies
that permit FTOs to post graphic videos and images of executions and
tortures is illogical.168 Section 230(e)(1) of the CDA specifically states
a court should not construe the CDA to impair the enforcement of any
federal criminal statute (e.g., the material support statutes).169 Therefore,
despite preceding case law, the court in Force should not even consider
the CDA as an applicable defense to the material support statutes given
165. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 24 (2010) (defining coordination
broadly where a connection between the service and the FTO is required); see id. at 26 (describing
a more narrow version of coordination that involves under the direction of, or in coordination with,
a FTO); see also Knox, supra note 156, at 315–18 (exploring how providing a social media platform
satisfies the variations of Holder’s coordination test); Wittes & Bedell, supra note 146 (satisfying
an even narrower definition of coordination to require formal elements, like a contract).
166. See Wittes & Bedell, supra note 146 (establishing a direct link by virtue of a contract,
where the FTO agrees to abide by the social media company’s terms of service in order to use the
service).
167. Essentially, Facebook agrees to provide material support in the form of a social media
platform, to be used for recruiting, fundraising, and disseminating propaganda. Id. The FTO agrees
to abide by the terms of service, which brings increased traffic to the site and possibly creates more
ad revenue for the social media company. Knox, supra note 156, at 316.
168. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In
other words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to
section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”). For examples of
the types of gruesome and violent posts FTOs put on social media, see supra Part II.C. See supra
Part II.B for a discussion on section 230 of the CDA. See Wittes & Bedell, supra note 123
(questioning whether the CDA immunizes Twitter from liability); see also Ruanne, supra note 23,
at 22 (noting section 230 does not operate as a bar to liability if the underlying content is illegal);
see generally Berger & Morgan, supra note 7 (analyzing and describing how ISIS uses Twitter and
what types of content it posts).
169. 47 U.S.C. 230(e)(1); see Wittes & Bedell, supra note 53 (describing why the CDA should
not immunize social media companies from civil liability for providing platforms to FTOs).
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the CDA’s statutory language and because liability under section 2333 is
a predicated federal law violation.
Courts should find that social media companies lose their immunity
the instant they knowingly provide FTOs with social medial platforms in
violation of section 2339B; and therefore, courts should not allow the
CDA immunity defense to survive.170 This Article argues that removing
this hurdle and alleviating the burden on plaintiffs in civil lawsuits could
help combat global terror because an increase in lawsuits could stifle the
flow of money to FTOs.171
B. Amending Section 2339A’s Definition of Material Support
Regardless of the future outcome of Force, this Article recognizes that
the most direct and efficient way to prevent FTOs from accessing and
manipulating social media platforms to perpetuate terrorism is for
Congress to amend section 2339A’s definition of material support to
explicitly include the provision of a social media platform.172 Section
2339A currently defines “material support or resources” as “any property,
tangible or intangible, or service.”173 As discussed, Holder found that
“service” refers to concerted activity that is “directed to, or coordinated
with,” a FTO.174 Therefore, to prove a social media company,
specifically, provided “material support” to a FTO, in violation of the
material support statutes, a prosecutor or plaintiff must apply Holder’s
coordination test to prove that the social media company knowingly
provided services directly to or in coordination with a FTO.175 But this
is a difficult task.
170. See Wittes & Bedell, supra note 53 (differentiating the material support statutes’ operation
from the CDA on the basis that the material support statutes have nothing to do with offending
content where criminal liability is incurred the instant an individual or entity knowingly provides
material support to a FTO); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (defining a material support statue
violation); see generally John Doe & Other Members of the Football Team at Ill. State Univ. v.
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (indicating a service provider may lose civil liability
immunity under CDA if the provider aided a crime); M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Vill. Voice Media
Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (same); but see Hinton v. Amazon.com,
LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 685, 691 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (indicating that aiding a crime may not create a
civil liability exception); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-cv-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *6 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (same).
171. See DiGregoria, supra note 105 (illustrating the stifling effect civil lawsuits have on FTOs’
cash flow).
172. Leaving this up to judicial interpretation will inevitably create a circuit split, considering
the already ambiguous definition of coordination. Aaron Tuley, Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project: Redefining Free Speech Protection in the War on Terror, 49 IND. L.J. 579, 600–01 (2016).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2009).
174. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 24 (2010).
175. Id.
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Including social media platforms within section 2339A’s definition of
material support would alleviate prosecutors’ and plaintiffs’ burdens to
establish the material support statutes’ requisite “coordination test.” If
Congress were to include “social media platform” into the definition of
“material support,” a prosecutor or plaintiff would have to prove that a
social media company knowingly provided a social media platform (i.e.,
material support) to a FTO to allege a violation of section 2339B.
Therefore, by merely knowingly providing a social medial platform, a
social medial company would violate section 2339B’s plain language. In
other words, courts would no longer analyze whether social media
platforms are “intangible services directed to, coordinated with, or
controlled by” FTOs,176 but would rather focus on whether the social
media company knowingly provided its platform to a FTO.
But Holder found that some forms of support cannot be given without
coordination.177 Therefore, some form of coordination is likely required,
but this Article urges courts to find coordination to exist when a social
media company provides or fails to remove a suspect social media
account that a FTO used to further terror objectives.178 Providing a social
media platform creates “harmonious action” between FTOs and social
media companies because both parties benefit.179 FTOs receive a
platform to spread terrorist propaganda, recruit, and fundraise and the
social media company benefits because it increases traffic to its service
that may not otherwise exist, and can profit off that increased traffic via
advertisements.180 Moreover, courts should construe the deliberate
failure of social media companies to remove terrorist-run accounts as
coordination because by failing to remove these accounts, social media
companies are no longer passively providing data and content services,
but are engaging in harmonious action allowing FTOs to pursue their
terroristic objectives.181
Congress, however, should retain the current mens rea elements of
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; Holder, 561 U.S. at 36.
177. Holder, 561 U.S. at 24.
178. Knox, supra note 156, at 316.
179. Id. at 315–18; see Holder, 561 U.S. at 43–44 (defining coordination).
180. See Hughes & Vidino, supra note 153 (discussing social media’s recruitment benefits); see
generally Complaint at 45–46, Force v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10,
2016) (alleging the benefits Hamas derives from using Facebook); THE CAMSTOLL GRP., USE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA BY TERRORIST FUNDRAISERS & FINANCIERS (Apr. 2016),
https://www.camstoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Social-Media-Report-4.22.16.pdf
(reporting the fundraising benefits social media companies provide to FTOs).
181. See Blake, supra note 145 (discussing social media companies’ conscious failure to
remove accounts); see also Knox, supra note 156, at 316 (explaining social media companies’
failure to remove accounts they know are run by terrorists as “coordination”).
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both sections 2339A and 2339B.182 But a plaintiff or prosecutor could
easily satisfy section 2339B’s current mens rea requirement by merely
citing to the widespread notoriety of FTOs using social media to
propagate terror attacks.183
Finally, this Article’s proposed amended definition would also
simplify civil lawsuits under section 2333, because it would restrict a
social media company’s ability to shield itself under the CDA because
the initial provision of the platform would violate section 2339B.184 As
a result, most section 2333 civil lawsuits would turn on whether the
provision of an account proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries, which
the Force complaint appears to accomplish by alleging Hamas used
Facebook to actively call upon its supporters to engage in jihad and
terrorism against American-Jews and Israelis.
Clearing the barriers to civil lawsuits could add another weapon in the
court’s arsenal against the war on terrorism,185 but this Article’s proposal
inherently raises the question of whether it is feasible for social media
companies to know whether a FTO uses their services.186 This Article
proposes that a court should prohibit the use of CDA immunity and assess
liability when a social media company knowingly provides an individual
or FTO a social media platform used to establish an online, terroristic
presence. Companies could still escape liability, however, if the social
media company neither knew nor had reason to know a FTO, or an
affiliated individual, signed up for the service. The plain language of
Facebook’s and Twitter’s terms of service clearly outlaw any activity that
182. See Holder, 561 U.S. at 21 (holding the knowledge requirement reduces the potential for
vagueness challenges); see also Knox, supra note 156, at 319 (noting when knowledge is not overt,
defendants typically satisfy a more stringent level of mens rea in material support prosecutions);
but see Knox, supra note 156, at 322 (urging Congress to amend the law to require a specific intent
to further the FTOs’ goals, similar to the mens rea in section 2339A).
183. See Knox, supra note 156, at 319–21 (articulating how social media companies may have
the requisite means rea for section 2339B prosecutions); see also Blake, supra note 145 (reporting
the vast and widespread public knowledge of terrorists exploiting social media); see generally
Complaint, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016) (demonstrating Facebook’s actual
knowledge that FTOs exploit the platform to perpetuate terrorism and terror attacks).
184. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (“[N]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of . . . any other federal criminal statute.”).
185. See DiGregoria, supra note 105 (noting civil lawsuits potentially stifle cash flow to FTOs).
186. See Ashlee Vance, Facebook: The Making of 1 Billion Users, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2012, 6:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-1004/facebook-the-making-of-1-billion-users (noting that over one billion people use Facebook); see
also Knox, supra note 156, at 319 (noting how over 200 million users, in twenty-one languages,
use
Twitter
each
day);
Localization
&
Translation,
FACEBOOK,
https://developers.facebook.com/docs/internationalization (last visited May 5, 2017) (noting
Facebook is used in over seventy languages).
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promotes and incites violence and terrorism and both companies can
monitor the content of users’ posts.187 Amending section 2339A would
effectively compel social media companies to enforce their own policies,
with less bias.188 Facebook, when responding to third-party complaints,
would be more inclined to suspend or shut down terrorist-run accounts if
the failure to do so could result in sizeable monetary fines, civil liability,
and or imprisonment.189
Companies like Facebook and Twitter are just that: companies, not
people. As such, it might be difficult to determine whether a company
possesses the requisite scienter. To overcome this hurdle, prosecutors
and plaintiffs will likely find the collective knowledge theory as the most
appropriate way to evaluate whether a social media company knowingly
provided material support to FTOs.190 Under the collective knowledge
theory in a section 2339B prosecution, the government would only need
to provide evidence that showed an employee, acting within the scope of
his or her employment, knew that a given FTO used the social media
service.191 In October 2013, Twitter suspended twelve accounts of
known jihadists, but reinstated those same accounts just a few days
later.192 This example should prove that at least one Twitter employee
187. See Community Standards, supra note 149 (banning FTOs from using Facebook); see also
Knox, supra note 156, at 317 (discussing YouTube’s “Content ID System” that allows YouTube
to identify and manage content online); see id. (noting an information gathering system developed
by the Department of Homeland Security that could operate similarly to YouTube’s “Content ID
System”).
188. See Phillip Klein, Facebook Says Page Calling for Death to Jews Doesn’t Violate
“Community
Standards,”
WASH. EXAMINER (July 28,
2014,
11:45
AM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/article/2551348 (highlighting Facebook’s bias and
inconsistency when responding to third-party complaints to show Facebook knows terror groups
use the service but preserves terror groups’ posts); see also Rasgon, supra note 148 (reporting that
Facebook shut down a Hamas leader’s account several times, yet he was able to keep his Twitter
account); see generally Complaint at 45–46, Force, No. 1:16-cv-05490 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2016)
(alleging Facebook’s deliberate failure to remove known posts, pages, and accounts of Hamas).
189. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (identifying a twenty-year maximum prison sentence for a
violation); see also Blake, supra note 145 (noting Twitter does not currently report suspicious
accounts to law enforcement); Doyle, supra note 13, at 20 (confirming a maximum $500,000 fine
for organizational defendants); Knox, supra note 156, at 317 (outlining how social media
companies could work with law enforcement to identify potential terroristic activity on their
websites).
190. See Knox, supra note 156, at 320 (defining the collective knowledge theory and its
application).
191. See U.S. v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (explaining the
collective knowledge theory and how it applies to corporate defendants); accord Knox, supra note
156, at 320–21 (explaining how social media companies likely satisfy the knowledge requirement
under the collective knowledge theory).
192. J.M.
Berger
(@intelwire),
TWITTER
(Oct.
7,
2013,
11:17
AM),
https://twitter.com/intelwire/status/387280656616538112; see also Knox, supra note 156, at 320
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knew the accounts were run by jihadists, but more importantly, that
another employee reviewed the case and nonetheless subsequently
reinstated the accounts.
Not every case, however, will contain those conclusive facts.
Therefore, in addition to the collective knowledge theory, prosecutors
and plaintiffs should use the notoriety theory to establish knowledge.193
Social media companies, specifically Facebook, have the ability to track
and monitor their users’ data.194 This internal monitoring system allows
social media companies to identify individuals who become radicalized
over time.
C. Criticisms
Some may argue that this Article’s proposal would unduly broaden the
material support statutes and effectively burden First Amendment rights.
The proposed broad regulations and the expected threat to a social media
company will undoubtedly result in social media companies mistakenly
shutting down accounts belonging to individuals who are not associated
with FTOs, but merely sympathize with them. But this Article does not
find that its proposals would unduly burden the First Amendment rights
of individuals, even if a social media company erroneously suspended or
deactivated a social media account.
It should be noted that FTOs and individuals linked to FTOs abroad,
do not have First Amendment rights.195 Additionally, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the government may restrict certain categories of
speech, like fighting words, incitements to imminent violence, child
pornography, and obscenity.196 Courts will likely consider the
(discussing the suspension of known jihadists’ twitter accounts).
193. See Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived
from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 NAT’L. SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 28 (2005) (explaining how
the widespread notoriety of an organization that engages in terrorist activities can easily persuade
a jury of the defendant’s knowledge).
194. See Knox, supra note 156, at 317 (discussing programs that allow social media companies
to track and monitor user activity); Michael Roppolo, Personalized Ads Coming to Facebook, CBS
NEWS (June 12, 2014, 2:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/facebook-rolls-out-adpreferences-but-gets-more-user-data/ (noting how Facebook customizes advertisements based on
user activity); Ruanne, supra note 23, at 17–18 (outlining the widespread use and public knowledge
of terror groups using social media).
195. Groups and individuals that are not United States citizens do not have these rights, as the
United States Constitution only applies United States citizens. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
196. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (listing traditionally recognized
categories of speech that may be prohibited); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
(holding that free speech does not protect an individual who falsely shouts “fire” in a crowded
theatre and causes a panic); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2552 (outlawing the dissemination of child
pornography); see generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (outlawing speech that
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prohibition of the provision of social media platforms as a content-based
restriction; therefore, the restriction must pass the strict scrutiny test to
alleviate constitutional concerns.197 The prohibition will undoubtedly
surpass this rigorous test because it is fully documented and accepted that
combatting terrorism, especially preventing “home-grown extremists,” is
a compelling state interest and outlawing companies from giving certain
individuals and entities social media accounts is narrowly tailored to
further that interest.198 This Article asserts that the proposed amended
statute would likely satisfy the narrowly tailored prong because it would
only prohibit a social media company from knowingly providing a social
media platform to a FTO or an individual who is known to be associated
with a FTO.199 This Article also asserts that the institution of an appeals
process could solve the above-mentioned concerns. By instituting an
appeals process where an individual can petition social media companies
to re-activate accounts by sufficiently demonstrating they are not
associated with a FTO could constitute as a low restriction on speech.
CONCLUSION
America is at war. Albeit, an unfamiliar cyber war with FTOs that
exploit social media services to recruit, fundraise, and disseminate
propaganda to perpetuate terror attacks across the globe. Allowing FTOs
to flourish on social media places the lives of thousands of American
civilians and service members at risk. Social media companies have
consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to stay ahead of the curve
when it comes to combatting terrorism. America is a step behind the rest
of the world in recognizing the very real threat that social media use by
FTOs poses.200 The Force litigation will lay the foundation for social
incites violence).
197. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (sustaining regulations that burden
speech where the government interest in enacting legislation is unrelated to the suppression of
speech); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989) (“Even in a public forum
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”).
198. See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (expressing the
government’s significant and compelling interest in combatting global terrorism). The narrowly
tailored element is satisfied because the prohibition would only cover the narrow category of
knowingly providing social media platforms to FTOs. Id. at 26.
199. See id. at 24 (differentiating between independent advocacy for a cause an individual
agrees with from providing a service to a group to further that cause).
200. See Blake, supra note 145 (reporting the United Kingdom’s dismay with America’s
reluctance to stop social media companies from providing their services to FTOs); see also
Conclusions and Recommendations, UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENTARY PUBLICATIONS
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media prosecutions because it articulates how valuable of a resource
social media is to FTOs and also highlights how social media companies
know FTOs use their platforms. Additionally, the Force complaint
demonstrates why the CDA should not immunize social companies from
civil liability because the initial provision of a platform is a criminal
violation. Ultimately, this Article urges Congress to act swiftly and
definitively to not only prevent future attacks, but to prevent FTOs from
radicalizing Americans through social media. Including the “provision
of a social media platform” into section 2339A’s definition of material
support will give the government the tool it needs to fight against, and
deter future, terrorism.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/13509.htm#_idTextAn
chor053 (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) (reporting and recommending alternative courses of actions for
America’s fight against global terrorism).

